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Towards the judicial recognition of the right to live in a 
stable climate system in the European legal space? 
Preliminary remarks• 
di Serena Baldin 
Abstract: Verso il riconoscimento giudiziale del diritto di vivere in un sistema climatico 
stabile nello spazio giuridico europeo? Osservazioni preliminari – This essay has a 
threefold purpose: it aims at contributing to the literature on climate change litigation by 
discussing a recent lawsuit launched against the European Union, namely the Carvalho case; 
at identifying recent trends in the circulation of models in this ambit; and at introducing the 
topic of the right to live in a stable climate system. In this perspective, the essay proceeds as 
follows. As a starting point, a brief illustration of the threat posed by climate change and the 
international climate regime are outlined. Subsequently, sections 2 and 3 deal with the themes 
of the classifications of climate change case law and of the so-called attribution science and its 
relevance in climate change litigation, making some references to the Dutch Urgenda case, 
which inspired the Carvalho case. In section 4, an account of the EU climate change-related 
disputes and of the Carvalho case rendered by the General Court in 2019 and currently 
pending in appeal before the Court of Justice is provided. This controversy is part of a new 
generation of climate cases that adopts a rights-based approach and calls for climate justice. 
Then, in section 5, an illustration of the problematic issue of legal standing in the EU 
jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 263(4) TFEU is provided. Lastly, section 6 concludes with 
reflections on the potential for litigation strategy to contribute to the effective enforcement of 
climate change law in the European legal sphere and on the right to live in a stable climate 
system. 
Keywords: Climate change litigation; Attribution science; Access to justice; Right to live in a 
stable climate system. 
1. Climate crisis in the Anthropocene and climate change litigation strategy  
Climate crisis is the major challenge we are facing in the contemporary era. For 
decades experts have warned policy-makers of the risks of global warming, but it 
is only in very recent times that there has been a widespread public awareness of 
the adverse effects linked with this phenomenon and the need to take action with 
the utmost urgency. With the explicit purpose of emphasising the role played by 
human beings on the degradation of the Earth’s ecosystems and on the changing 
of climate and the correlated rise of the average surface temperature, many 
scientists employ the term Anthropocene when referring to the current geological 
 
• This essay is part of the project “Environmental Sustainability in Europe: A Socio-Legal 
Perspective”, co-funded by the European Union through the Actions Jean Monnet Modules 
(coordinated by prof. Serena Baldin of the University of Trieste, Italy). 
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era. They date it back to the latter part of the 18th century, when the anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere due to industrial activities began 
to increase considerably1. 
The elaborate international climate change regime includes the 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol, and the 2015 Paris Agreement. The UNFCCC is the first act in the world 
aimed at stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, on the 
assumption that human activities are changing the global climate system and these 
alterations affect human and natural systems negatively. Climate change is defined 
in Art. 1, para. 2, UNFCCC as the «change of climate which is attributed directly 
or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global 
atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over 
comparable time periods»2. The UNFCCC has been complemented by the Kyoto 
Protocol, which has the objective of reducing by 5% the global gas emissions by 
2012 compared to 1990. The Protocol provides for binding targets, while the 
UNFCCC only encourages industrialised countries to stabilise gas emissions. The 
Paris Agreement adopts a new approach of global cooperation, representing a shift 
away from the top-down regulatory approach that had previously underpinned the 
international climate change regime. It combines the bottom-up national target-
setting with a top-down oversight system3. The fundamental core of this accord 
is enshrined in Art. 2, where it is affirmed that the global response to the threat of 
climate change has to be faced by keeping «the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to 
limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognising 
that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change».  
From a constitutional law perspective, the debate on climate change is 
embedded in the human rights discourse for the implications that global heating 
has on fundamental rights. This is clearly pointed out in the Paris Agreement. In 
its preamble, it is acknowledged that this problem is a common concern of 
humankind and that the «Parties should, when taking action to address climate 
change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human 
rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, 
migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations 
and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women 
and intergenerational equity». According to the UN Special Rapporteur on human 
rights and the environment, a safe climate is a vital element of the right to a 
 
1 See P.J. Crutzen, E.F. Stoermer, The Anthropocene, in IGBP Global Change Newsletter, 41, 
2000, 17. 
2 For an explanation of the first stages in the development of international climate change 
policy, see J. Werksman, J. Lefevere, A. Runge-Metzger, The EU and International Climate 
Change Policy, in J. Delbeke, P. Vis (eds), EU Climate Policy Explained, European Union, 2016, 
94 ff., at ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/eu_climate_policy_explained_en.pdf. 
3 See J. Kreienkamp, The Long Road to Paris. The History of the Global Climate Change Regime, 
in UCL Policy Brief, 2019, 9, at www.ucl.ac.uk/global-governance/news/2019/nov/long-
road-paris-history-global-climate-change-regime. 
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healthy environment and is absolutely essential to human life and wellbeing4. The 
failure of the States to take adequate steps to address global warming constitutes 
a violation of the right to a healthy environment.  
It is also worth noting that the anthropogenic interference on the Earth’s 
average surface temperature, perceived as a relevant political matter, has been 
acknowledged by a large number of States. Almost all of them have signed the UN 
climate change agreements5 and have introduced legislations aimed at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions and at adapting the impact of climate change. The 
phenomenon has been even considered at constitutional level. In this vein, the 
Constitutions of Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Thailand, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, Zambia, and also the draft Constitution of Gambia, foresee that plans of 
management of lands or natural resources need to be carried out adopting 
measures for the mitigation of global warming6. 
In the European Union, the legal basis for taking climate actions are 
enshrined in Art. 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) 
concerning the incorporation of environmental protection within the Union’s 
policies and activities and in the Title XX TFEU, headed «Environment» 
(Articles 191-193). In particular, Art. 191 TFEU affirms that this supranational 
organisation shall contribute to pursue the objective of «promoting measures at 
international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, 
and in particular combating climate change». In preparing its policy, the EU is 
required to take account of «available scientific and technical data, environmental 
conditions in the various regions of the Union, the potential benefits and costs of 
action or lack of action, the economic and social development of the Union as a 
whole and the balanced development of its regions». The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (Charter) also provides for «Environmental protection» in 
its Art. 37, although this provision is formulated as a policy objective which the 
EU shall strive towards rather than as a human right to a collective good. 
Furthermore, according to Art. 4(2)(e) TFEU, the environment is included in the 
 
4 See United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations 
relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, A/74/161, 15 July 
2019. 
5 To date, the UNFCCC has 197 parties. The US has ratified the UNFCCC but not the Kyoto 
Protocol. Moreover, after having signed the Paris Agreement, the Trump administration 
notified UN of US withdrawal from this accord. Other significant emitters which are not 
parties of the Paris Agreement are Iran and Turkey. 
6 Art. 407 Const. Bolivia of 2009; art. 194 Const. Dominican Republic of 2015; art. 414 Const. 
Ecuador of 2008; art. 258 Const. Thailand of 2017; art. 127 Const. Venezuela of 1999; art. 63 
Const. Vietnam of 2013; art. 257 Const. Zambia of 2016; art. 252 of the draft Constitution of 
Gambia. Other constitutions have a less incisive approach on this matter. The preamble of the 
Const. Côte d’Ivoire of 2016 affirms the State’s commitment to contributing to climate 
protection and to maintaining a healthy environment for future generations. The Const. 
Tunisia of 2014 recognises the right to participate in the protection of climate (art. 45), as it 
is only the political commitment of Tunisian citizens. With yet another perspective, in the 
new Constitution of Cuba, art. 16(f) of the Chapter II devoted to international relations, states 
that Cuba «Promotes the protection and conservation of the environment as well as 
responding to climate change, which threatens the survival of the human species, through the 
recognition of common, yet differential, responsibilities».  
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category of the shared competences between the EU and its member States. 
However, climate change is an issue that cannot seriously be tackled at national 
level alone. Hence, member States have delegated to the Union a leading role in 
facing this phenomenon7. Currently, the EU aims at achieving net-zero emissions 
by 20508. In addition to policies and secondary legislations in this regard, the EU 
is a signatory of the UNFCCC and its complementary acts, the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Paris Agreement.  
Arrangements and actions undertaken in this ambit reveal that, in general, 
States are well aware of the need for an effective response to the threat of climate 
change, even if at the same time efforts to curb the related measures are noted. 
Opposed initiatives have the scope of delaying choices not considered as priorities 
or that of lowering the most rigorous standards of gas emissions for furthering 
the interests of certain industrial sectors, in particular fossil fuel companies9. Due 
to inadequate responses or unsatisfactory steps forward to counteract global 
heating on part of governments and gas-emitting corporations, affected groups 
have turned to mobilisation campaigns. Nowadays we are witnessing a growing 
number of strikes and demonstrations seeking public and private climate change 
accountability. In the meantime, NGOs and activists put pressure on States and 
corporations also through judicial disputes. These have flourished in the last 
handful of years under the umbrella of a global litigation campaign known as 
Atmospheric Trust Litigation, which is based on the assumption that domestic 
courts may order that political branches take decisive measures to face the climate 
crisis. 
Climate change litigation has been defined in a very broad sense as «any 
piece of federal, state, tribal, or local administrative or judicial litigation in which 
the party filings or tribunal decisions directly and expressly raise an issue of fact 
or law regarding the substance or policy of climate change causes and impacts»10. 
 
7 See R. Louvin, Climate stability as a common good: a strategy for the European Union, in S. Baldin, 
S. De Vido (eds), Environmental Sustainability in the European Union: Socio-Legal Perspectives, 
Trieste, 2020, 124. 
8 The ambitious roadmap for green transition that should cut greenhouse gas emissions was 
illustrated by the President of the European Commission Ursula Von der Leyen to the EU 
leaders in December 2019, and it was followed by a proposal for a regulation with a binding 
objective of climate neutrality by 2050. See Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “The European Green Deal”, Brussels, 
11.12.2019, COM(2019) 640 final; and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending 
Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law), Brussels, 4.3.2020, COM(2020) 80 
final. 
9 For example, ExxonMobil has been suspected of suppressing climate change research as well 
as spreading doubt about climate science in advertorials, applying the same strategy used in 
the past by companies involved in tobacco and asbestos litigation. In addition, very recently 
it would have been an attempt to influence the EU Commission to change its approach towards 
climate regulation in the transport sector. See G. Supran, N. Oreskes, Assessing ExxonMobil’s 
Climate Change Communications (1977-2014), in Environmental Research Letters, 12, 2017, 1 ff.; 
E. Collins, ExxonMobil attempts to influence the European Green Deal, InfluenceMap, 6 march 
2020, at influencemap.org/report/An-InfluenceMap-Note-ExxonMobil-Lobbies-the-EU-
Commission-add01200dc694b00e9ac4bebf660227b. 
10 See D. Markell, J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New 
 The role of science in environmental  
and climate change adjudications 
 
 
DPCE online, 2020/2 – Saggi  
ISSN: 2037-6677 
1423 
Strategic litigation has generated a shift in the focal point of climate action, from 
the international arena to the domestic level, where the courts are called to impose 
on the States the meeting of their obligations. It is aimed at influencing public 
policy and at producing social change demanding climate justice to protect human 
rights, the adoption of regulations in conformity with international standards, the 
mitigation of greenhouse gases, adaptation to the impact of climate change, as well 
as compensation for climate-associated loss and damage11.  
Recent lawsuits have incorporated rights-based arguments to sustain the 
plaintiffs’ grievances, signalling a human rights turn in climate litigation12. 
Although there are barriers for direct access to justice in several jurisdictions and 
the final decisions are almost always in favour of the defendants – and hence 
ineffective though these cases garner public attention –, the increasing role of the 
courts in the global climate change governance in this manner is brought to light. 
Moreover, the transformative power that judges may have when they come to 
adjudicating fundamental rights matters is prompted and, in the very next future, 
their reasonings could become essential elements in building a multilevel workable 
response to climate change13.  
In this regard, the ground-breaking decision in the case Urgenda Foundation 
v the State of the Netherlands issued by a Dutch District Court in 2015 has been 
acclaimed as «an example for the world»14, and the same can be said for the 
judgements sentenced in second instance by the Hague Court of Appeal in 2018 
and then in cassation by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in December 2019. 
All the three rulings of this judicial saga have affirmed that the State failed to fulfil 
its obligations by not wanting to reduce greenhouse gas emissions according to 
international and EU standards, and have ordered the State to limit its emissions.  
As environmental human rights have gained recognition from the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the last decades, so one might suppose that 
the recent wave of climate change lawsuits currently pending in front of the 
national judges of the Old Continent will try to reach this regional jurisdiction 
that is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (ECHR), the first treaty 
of the Council of Europe (CoE) and the cornerstone of all its activities15. In the 
meantime, a recent case has been brought forward before the Courts of Justice of 
 
Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, in Florida Law Rev., 1, 2012, 27. 
11 The majority of this type of disputes are filed in the United States. A comprehensive 
database of climate litigation both in the United States and beyond is available at 
climatecasechart.com/. 
12 See J. Peel, H.M. Osofsky, A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?, in Transnational 
Environmental Law, 1, 2018, 37 ff. 
13 On the transformative adjudication in climate change lawsuits, see E. Barritt, B. Sediti, The 
Symbolic Value of Leghari v Federation of Pakistan: Climate Change Adjudication in the Global 
South, in King’s Law J., 2, 2019, 203 ff. 
14 See R. Cox, A Climate Change Litigation Precedent: Urgenda Foundation v The State of the 
Netherlands, in Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 2, 2016, 143 ff. 
15 In this vein, see S. Kirchner, Climate Change and Environmental Rights Litigation at the 
European Court of Human Rights: A View from the Arctic, in Law and Forensic Science, 2, 2017, 47 
ff. 
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the EU (CJEU) contending that the EU has failed and continues to fail to meet its 
purpose of reducing gas emissions and, as a consequence, it is infringing the 
fundamental rights of the applicants.  
In the pages that follow, the arguments put forward by the plaintiffs in the 
the case Armando Carvalho and Others v European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, also known as the People’s Climate case, will be examined16. This 
lawsuit offers answers to the following questions: which is the role of science in 
climate adjudication? Which are the most relevant and problematic profiles 
regarding the claims invoked in the Carvalho case and the procedure foreseen to 
bring it before the CJEU? Therefore, after an illustration of the manner in which 
climate change-related litigation has been classified and of the law and science 
relationship (§§ 2 and 3), the essay focuses on the Carvalho case, a controversy that 
is part of a new generation of lawsuits that adopts rights-based arguments calling 
for climate justice (§ 4). Since this lawsuit was dismissed by the General Court in 
2019 for lack of standing and currently is pending in appeal before the Court of 
Justice, an analysis of the problematic issue of the locus standi in the EU jurisdiction 
is also provided (§ 5). Lastly, the essay seeks answers to the questions concerning 
whether the Dutch Urgenda case, which inspired the Carvalho case, has become a 
model of climate lawsuit that is circulating in Europe or elsewhere, and whether 
there are differences between the right to a healthy environment and the right to 
live in a stable climate system that is invoked in certain cases. Accordingly, the 
essay concludes with some reflections on the potential contribution of litigation 
strategy to the effective enforcement of climate change law in the European legal 
sphere and speculates upon the right to live in a stable climate system (§ 6).  
2. Classifications of climate case law and comparative legal issues 
Before embarking on the analysis of the Carvalho case, a preliminary clarification 
on what falls under the label of climate change litigation seems necessary. Indeed, 
the burgeoning number of lawsuits has heightened the interest in this topic. 
Numerous attempts to classify climate case law have been made during the years, 
despite the fact that scholars have immediately acknowledged the heterogeneity 
of the objects covered by these controversies17. According to most of them, every 
lawsuit that raises climate change arguments is a case of climate litigation, even if 
this issue does not serve as the legal basis of the claim, being only a peripheral 
profile18. 
 
16 EU General Court (Second Chamber), 08.05.2019, 888764/19, case T-330/18. The 
application is available at peoplesclimatecase.caneurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 
05/application-delivered-to-european-general-court-1.pdf. 
17 In general, on the issue of classifications from a legal point of view, see L. Pegoraro, Diritto 
costituzionale comparato. La scienza e il metodo, Bologna, 2014, 143 ff.; S. Baldin, Classifications 
and fuzzy logic: a comparative law perspective, in S. Bagni, G.A. Figueroa Mejía, G. Pavani 
(coords), La ciencia del derecho constitucional comparado. Estudios en Homenaje a Lucio Pegoraro, 
I, Ciudad de México, 2017, 129 ff. 
18 See J. Setzer, M. Bangalore, Regulating climate change in the courts, in A. Averchenkova, S. 
Fankhauser, M. Nachmany (eds), Trends in Climate Change Legislation, Cheltenham, 2017, 177. 
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A first criterion to draw a distinction among the whole set of these judicial 
disputes concerns the public-private divide. Public climate litigation refers to cases 
begun to exert bottom-up pressure on governments, whereas private litigation is 
addressed against greenhouse gas-emitting companies. Both types of lawsuit seek 
to compel defendants to mitigate, adapt or compensate for losses incurred by the 
effects of climate change. However, public climate litigation is especially focused 
on the judicial review of regulatory actions or inactions and strives to influence 
decision-makers mainly through the attainment of injunctive reliefs. The decisions 
may lead to several results, such as the adoption of more stringent emission 
standards, the inclusion of emission limits in regulatory permits, the delay or 
revocation of permits and licences, and more rigorous procedural obligations19. 
Public climate litigation against governments has been further distinguished 
depending on whether the cases ask for better mitigation measures, or adaptation 
measures, or respect for procedural requirements. The first type of lawsuits, 
known as mitigation claims, seeks to compel authorities to take more rigorous 
measures to stop or reduce gas emissions or to support alternatives as renewable 
energy. The cases Urgenda in the Netherlands and Pena in Colombia fall into this 
class20. They are focused on human rights-based mitigation claims against 
countries that did not actively prevent climate-related harms, thereby violating 
human rights for inadequate action on greenhouse gas emissions. The second type 
of lawsuits, known as adaptation claims, strive to ensure that governments take 
adaptation measures addressed to affected communities or potentially affected 
ones, in particular the most vulnerable and weak segments of the society. The 
landmark ruling issued in the Pakistani Leghari case of 2018 is the emblem of this 
class21. The third type of lawsuits, called procedural claims, deals with the respect 
of procedural requirements in the context of land use and planning, as in the cases 
of lack of environmental impact assessment (EIA) or denial of access to 
information or inadequate public participation in the decision-making process22. 
 
19 See G. Ganguly, J. Setzer, V. Heyvaert, If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for 
Climate Change, in Oxford J. Legal Studies, 4, 2018, 3. 
20 The case Pena and Others v Government of Colombia was decided by the Colombia’s Supreme 
Court of Justice in 2018. The Court found the Colombian government liable for not halting 
the increasing deforestation of the Amazon forest, provoking an increase in the average 
temperature and threatening the young people’s rights to life, health, food, water and a healthy 
environment. The decision also recognised that the Amazon Basin is a subject of rights. 
21 In the case Ashgar Leghari v Federation of Pakistan, the Lahore High Court Green Bench 
held that the State had violated citizens’ rights to life, dignity and property and ordered the 
government to take measures to minimise the repercussions of global warming, including 
presenting a list of climate adaptation measures and to establish a Climate Change 
Commission in order that urgent action be taken to address the impact of climate change. 
Interestingly, the Court makes a distinction between environmental justice, regarded as 
localised, and climate justice, which is a more complex global problem. As a consequence, 
climate justice moves beyond local environmental justice to embrace multiple new dimensions, 
such as health, food security, human trafficking and disaster management. For a comment, see 
J. Peel, H.M. Osofsky, op. cit., 37 ff.; E. Barritt, B. Sediti, op. cit., 203 ff. 
22 Greenpeace International, Holding your Government Accountable for Climate Change: A People’s 
Guide, 2018, 31 ff., www.greenpeace.org/international/publication/.  
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A slightly different categorisation based on whether the defendant is a public 
entity or a private company divides the public controversies into four groups. On 
the basis of the type of action challenged are identified as follows: a substantive 
government group, addressed to substantive climate change mitigation or 
adaptation actions (which imply the adoption of a statute or a policy); an EIA and 
permitting group, focused on procedural requirements in the context of land use 
and planning; a rights group, finalised to extend the scope of human rights, 
property or civil rights to provide protection to individuals or the public against 
the effects of climate change, which includes lawsuits for access to information or 
for public participation in decision-making processes; and a climate science group, 
which includes a few miscellaneous claims related to the portrayal of climate 
science or climate scientists and the dissemination of climate science23. 
A further proposal tries to classify climate change-related controversies in a 
way that is supposed to be collectively exhaustive and that simultaneously can 
enable mutually exclusive categories to be drawn. With this aim, the nature of the 
climate change regulatory regime in the jurisdiction where the lawsuit is brought 
and the consequences of the adjudication are the two criteria chosen to elaborate 
a typology. The first variable distinguishes the regulatory regimes depending on 
whether they are designed specifically and avowedly for the purposes of 
addressing anthropogenic climate change or not (called dedicated and non-
dedicated climate change legal regimes). The second variable gives rise to 
alternatives subject to the judicial outcome: a negative decision implies that the 
emission reductions not be made; a positive decision allows for emission 
reductions. The combination of these two criteria leads to a matrix of four types 
of litigation: defensive, promotive, challenging and perfecting24. With regard to 
the second variable, one may wonder to what extent it can be useful to know 
whether the final adjudication provides for the emissions reduction. Especially in 
the hypotheses in which the research viewpoint goes beyond the national scenario, 
the different rules and procedures underpinning adjudications in each State can 
affect the final decision. For this reason, the arguments put forward by the parties 
and the legal reasoning exposed by the judges may offer more insight than the 
decision itself.  
Two things should be observed in this regard. Firstly, the above-mentioned 
proposals may give rise to criticism because they appear to be too wide or pointless 
through the lens of comparative law. Comparative legal research needs to 
elaborate a tertium comparationis, i.e. a common comparative denominator that 
depends on common elements which render judicial phenomena «meaningfully 
comparable», with the goal of achieving fruitful outcomes25.  
 
23 Private claims are divided into two groups, according to whether the defendant is a 
corporation or an individual. See M. Wilensky, Climate Change in the Courts: An Assessment of 
Non-U.S. Climate Litigation, in Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum, 26, 2015, 136 ff. 
24 See N.J. Ghaleigh, ‘Six Honest Serving-Men’: Climate Change Litigation as Legal Mobilization 
and the Utility of Typologies, in Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper Series, 8, 2010, 7 ff., at 
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1574928. 
25 See E. Örücü, Methodology of comparative law, in J.M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, Cheltenham, 2006, 442. More in general, on the usefulness of comparative 
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Secondly, as shown in these pages, climate concerns generally fall under the 
umbrella of environmental issues and, in parallel, stable or safe climate is 
considered a vital element of the right to a healthy environment. Additionally, the 
inclusion of EIA litigation in the aforementioned classifications suggests that 
climate issues may be overlapped or blended with the environmental ones. 
However, it has been stressed that climate lawsuits are to be kept separate from 
environmental litigation which is mainly focused on the recognition of damages. 
Indeed, rules and legal protection addressed towards the environment and climate 
differ. This is so because the environment coincides with a specific physical, 
territorial context, which is delimited and circumscribed. Differently, climate is 
considered as a hyperobject, namely an object so massively distributed in time and 
space as to transcend localisation26. Climate as a hyperobject means that it is an 
inter-spatial and inter-temporal condition which affects the biosphere and not just 
a specific context27.  
Breaches of international, supranational and national rules on greenhouse 
gas emission reductions in Europe affect both European citizens and individuals 
and communities all over the world. Not only: future generations are also 
jeopardised by global heating. Moreover, since climate change has and will have 
the biggest impact on the world’s most vulnerable people, climate justice looks at 
this phenomenon through a human rights lens. As a commentator said, climate 
justice «insists on a shift from a discourse on greenhouse gases and melting ice 
caps into a civil rights movement with the people and communities most 
vulnerable to climate impacts at its heart»28. Hence, how can these persons be 
protected? How can they demand the respect of State obligations and of their 
rights? And, turning to the topic of the classification of climate change case law 
related to the human rights discourse, how can one extrapolate the appropriate 
lawsuits among the high number of claims generally included in climate change 
litigation? 
Bearing in mind these issues, a stricter categorisation has been proposed on 
the basis of the so-called «motion of justice». The aim of this classificatory 
 
methodology to better reflect on certain phenomena, such as global warming, which impose a 
comparison with what is not known to our scientific knowledge, see R. Scarciglia, Scienza della 
complessità e comparazione giuridica nell’età dell’asimmetria, in DPCE, special edition, 2019, 701 
ff. Considerations on the utility of comparative methodology to assess whether and to what 
extent national legislations are aligned to meet the objective of reducing gas emissions and 
other issues related to climate change are made by Mehling, who suggests several fields of 
action for comparative legal scholars, such as the role of the legal traditions in the framing of 
climate change in the legal systems and the influence of the forms of State and the forms of 
government on climate policy development. See M. Mehling, The Comparative Law of Climate 
Change: A Research Agenda, in RECIEL, 3, 2015, 351 ff. 
26 See T. Morton, Introducing the idea of ‘hyperobjects’. A new way of understanding climate change 
and other phenomena, in High Country News, Jan. 19, 2015, at 
www.hcn.org/issues/47.1/introducing-the-idea-of-hyperobjects. 
27 Interview at Michele Carducci, published in “Diritto al clima: i cittadini fanno causa allo Stato”, 
in Terra Nuova, Settembre 2019, at www.terranuova.it/Il-Mensile/Diritto-al-clima-i-
cittadini-fanno-causa-allo-Stato. 
28 See Sustainable Development Goals, Climate justice, 2019, at 
www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/climate-justice/. 
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proposal is to bring out climate justice-related grievances29. A climate lawsuit of 
this type should be founded on: the climate debt among States or corporations; or 
the carbon budget, which is the budget indicating the amount of carbon dioxide 
that it can still emit in the atmosphere without exceeding the threshold of a 2°C 
increase in global temperature30; or the intensity of carbon, which is the quantity 
of carbon emitted per unit of energy consumed per capita. In other words, climate 
litigation should refer only to judicial cases in which the courts are to decide the 
conduct of States or corporations with respect to the climate obligations assumed 
under the Paris Agreement or other international treaties, so as to offer a 
possibility of effective protection of the applicants’ rights. This classification of 
climate case law would make it feasible to compare similar cases worldwide on the 
basis of their common elements31. 
According to this last proposal, only few lawsuits can be considered 
examples of climate justice, such as the already mentioned case Urgenda, the case 
Juliana in the United States32 and the case Carvalho in the EU, this latter subject 
of examination in §§ 4 and 5. When the Urgenda and Juliana lawsuits were decided 
in first instance in 2015 and 2016 respectively, they led to discuss the launch of a 
«next generation» of climate litigation, modeled on these cases. The difference 
between the first and the second generation lies in the fact that the former is 
characterised by lawsuits on individual, emissions-intensive projects, which have 
been brought under environmental statutes; they deal with governmental 
decision-making where the climate change considerations were missing during the 
approval of these projects. Conversely, the second generation does not focus any 
longer on specific projects; these lawsuits want to hold governments directly 
responsible for the effects of their activities on climate change33. 
3. Climate change attribution science and its relevance in the Urgenda case 
To appreciate the consequences of human-driven climate change at the judicial 
level, the law and science relationship needs to be properly understood. It has been 
noted that interdisciplinarity is quite often invoked in the fields of environmental 
 
29 On the «istanza di giustizia», see M. Carducci, La ricerca dei caratteri differenziali della 
“giustizia climatica”, in this Review, DPCE online, 2, 2020. Grievance has received little 
attention in the literature on climate change litigation, as stressed by Hilson, who suggests 
that it should be brought more squarely into law and social movement studies; C. Hilson, 
Climate Change Litigation in the UK: An Explanatory Approach (or Bringing Grievance Back In), 
in F. Fracchia, M. Occhiena (eds), Climate Change: la risposta del diritto, Napoli, 2010, 421 ff. 
30 Moreover, the carbon budget should be measured on the basis of the consumption of the 
States and not on the production of carbon budget in the States. This is because there are 
countries, such as China, which have a high rate of gas emissions due to their productive 
activities carried out to satisfy the demand of Western countries. 
31 See M. Carducci, La ricerca dei caratteri differenziali della “giustizia climatica”, cit. 
32 Case Juliana v United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1248 (D. Or. 2016). The plaintiffs, a 
group of persons aged eight to nineteen, filed a lawsuit against the US government for 
contributing to climate change and failing to control emissions from fossil fuel development 
and use. For other details, see below, § 6. 
33 See J. Peel, H. Osofsky, A. Foerster, A “Next Generation” of Climate Change Litigation?: an 
Australian Perspective, in Oñati Socio-legal Series, 3, 2019, 281. 
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and climate change law, especially to promote joint research with other social 
scientists in order to evaluate the role of society and the socio-economic impacts 
of loss and damage or other climate change-related issues34. It is also fundamental 
to spread the so-called Mother Earth approach (or ecosystem approach) in legal 
education, to encourage young generations of legal professionals to have a holistic 
understanding of the world. This should strengthen a vision of the law in harmony 
with the rules of nature35. Besides this, interdisciplinarity may also play a role in 
conjunction with physical and natural science. 
In observing the function performed by «science at the bar»36, a first issue 
to be pointed out is that the need to understand the technical aspects of a 
controversy is particularly salient in environmental litigation37. When scientific 
facts are inextricably linked to the petitum, some different approaches may be put 
into practice to assist judges in their activity, such as court-appointed experts, in-
house experts, expert judges (who assess environmental controversies together 
with legally trained judges), up to the establishment of specialised environmental 
courts38. 
In the same manner, climate change law features a technical character, since 
it is focused on the target of limiting the amount of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere39. Given that adjudication may also depend on the good use of 
scientific evidence in the courtroom, the science-law interface is a highly relevant 
profile in climate lawsuits as well. In very recent times, what leads to distinguish 
climate litigation from environmental litigation is that an overwhelming 
consensus has been reached around the science of climate change attribution, that 
is to say around the connection between a fact (the anthropocentric-induced 
 
34 Among many others, see M. Mehling, op. cit., 347. 
35 According to art. 2 of the UN Convention of Biological Diversity (1992), ecosystem «means 
a dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-living 
environment interacting as a functional unit». The Conference of the Parties, at its 5th Meeting 
held in 2000, endorsed the description of the ecosystem approach, that is «a strategy for the 
integrated management of land, water and living resources that promotes conservation and 
sustainable use in an equitable way». It is based on the application of appropriate scientific 
methodologies focused on levels of biological organisation which encompass the essential 
processes, functions and interactions among organisms and their environment. It recognizes 
that humans, with their cultural diversity, are an integral component of ecosystems. See at 
www.cbd.int/ecosystem/. See E. Macpherson, A Mother Earth Approach in Legal Education, 
2019, 1 ff., in files.harmonywithnatureun.org/uploads/upload793.pdf. 
36 Quoting the title of a book by S. Jasanoff, Science at the Bar. Law, Science, and Technology in 
America, Cambridge-London, 1997, in which the author explores how science and law interact 
in lawsuits where scientific facts have emerged and are highly contested. 
37 See M. Eliantonio, The Impact of EU Law on Access to Scientific Knowledge and the Standard of 
Review in National Environmental Litigation: A Story of Moving Targets and Vague Guidance, in 
European Energy and Environmental Law Rev., 2018, 115. 
38 In the European legal sphere, an interesting comparative study has been carried out by K. 
Sulyok, F. Bögös, T.M. Paloniitty, M. Eliantonio, Summary Report: Analysis of the Questionnaire, 
2019 EUFJE Conference on “The Role of Science in Environmental Adjudication”, 2019, at 
www.eufje.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=39&Itemid=226&lang=e
n. 
39 On the dependence of climate change policies and rules on scientific knowledge, see M. 
Torre-Schaub, La construcción del régimen jurídico del clima. Entre ciencia, derecho y política 
económica, in Rev. Catalana de Dret Ambiental, 1, 2019, 1 ff. 
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climate change) and its consequences (extreme weather events that cause disasters 
and damages). Research has contributed to the improvement of studies that 
directly link exceptional phenomena to climate change, namely «the branch of 
science which seeks to isolate the effect of human influence on the climate and 
related earth systems», as attribution science has been defined40.  
Advancements in attribution science have allowed experts to clarify the 
extent to which human activities on the global climate system cause both slow 
onset changes with irreversible impact and extreme weather events, which become 
«not only preventable, but demonstrably reasonably foreseeable»41. In particular, 
scientists have made significant steps forward in a new field of climate change 
attribution research devoted to single extreme weather events42. This emerging 
sector has assumed growing importance in private and public litigation, both at 
national and international level. 
Attribution science is fundamental for evaluating causation issues to 
determine liability in loss and damage legal controversies or, in other words, for 
evaluating the material causality of climate obligations. It is also useful to decide 
whether an issue is deemed justiciable or whether the claimants have standing to 
sue in the jurisdictions where the standing requirements are stringent. For 
example, in the widely quoted case Massachusetts v EPA of 2007, the US Supreme 
Court ruled that the plaintiffs had locus standi because scientific research supported 
the link between climate change and the inundation of state-owned and managed 
coastal land for which the State of Massachusetts has public trust responsibility43.  
The outcomes spread by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) act as scientific assumptions within the UN climate law system, thanks to 
the periodic publication of the syntheses of existing literature on climate change. 
This intergovernmental organisation established in 1988 to assess the science 
related to climate change does not conduct research itself. The IPCC studies the 
most recent scientific information that becomes available around the world and 
publishes reports which the States have to resort to. It is also noteworthy that 
attribution research has served as a framing mechanism for international 
negotiations, i.e. for the draft of the Paris Agreement, and has helped policy-
makers to assess the long-term impact and risks of climate change44.  
 
40 See M. Burger, J. Wentz, R. Horton, The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribution, in 
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 1, 2020, 62. The Authors also stress that climate 
science plays a central role in policymaking and planning, in particular where decisions need 
to be made about how to allocate the costs of mitigating and adapting to climate change. 
Research contributions include developments in the statistical and probabilistic methods, able 
to quantify the human influence on climate and on specific weather events. In this topic, see 
also J. Setzer, L.C. Vanhala, Climate change litigation: A review of research on courts and litigants 
in climate governance, in WIREs Climate Change, 3, 2019, 9. 
41 See S. Marjanac, L. Patton, Extreme weather event attribution science and climate change 
litigation: an essential step in the causal chain?, in Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 3, 
2018, 266. 
42 See R. Mechler et al., Science for Loss and Damage. Findings and Propositions, in R. Mechler et 
al. (eds), Loss and Damage from Climate Change. Concepts, Methods and Policy Options, Cham, 
2019, 25. 
43 See J. Setzer, L.C. Vanhala, op. cit., 9. 
44 See M. Burger, J. Wentz, R. Horton, op. cit., 143. On the internal processes and ways of 
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The most important aspect is that, ratifying the UN accords on climate 
change, the States have recognised the legitimacy of the IPCC’s findings. The EU 
has also acknowledged the IPCC as the definitive scientific body speaking on 
climate change and has incorporated the contents of its recent reports into policy-
making45. In sum, a general consensus has been created around the findings of 
climate change attribution science. 
The consequence of all this is that the IPCC’s reports play a fundamental 
role in the climate policy arena and in the courtrooms. As argued by a prominent 
legal scholar, scientific facts have taken on the status of legal sources, since the 
considerations on climate change and its direct impact are reserved to science 
exclusively46. In other words, there exists a «reservation to science» as a limit to 
political, legislative and interpretative discretion in climate issues47. A clause 
concerning the «incorporation by reference» to science by the UNFCCC from 
which to infer the facts according to the legal provisions is also foreseen. These 
science-related clauses are inferrable by the UNFCCC’s first three articles:  
- Art. 1 UNFCCC, entitled «Definition», relies on science to establish the 
meaning of several concepts, such as the adverse effects of climate change, climate 
change, climate systems, emissions, greenhouse gases, etc.;  
- Art. 2 UNFCCC, entitled «Objective», states that «The ultimate objective 
of this Convention […] is to achieve […] stabilisation of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be 
achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change […]». This goal has to be in line with the IPCC’s findings, which 
clarify the amount of reduction and the time limit related to the fixed targets;  
- Art. 3 UNFCCC, entitled «Principles», affirms in its para. 3 that «The 
Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the 
causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used 
as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and 
measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure 
global benefits at the lowest possible cost». This has to be considered a self-
executing and deontological provision, since it indicates the method and the 
objectives to be pursued in the climate sector, which are based on the reservation 
to science and on the incorporation by reference to science by the UNFCCC48. 
 
working of the IPCC, see D. French, B. Pontin, The science of climate change: a legal perspective 
on the IPCC, in D. Farber, M. Peeters (eds), Climate change law, Cheltenham, 2016, 9 ff. 
45 The Communication from the Commission, A Clean Planet for all - A European strategic long-
term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy, COM (2018) 773 final, 
28.11.2018, extensively makes references to the IPCC’s Special Report on the impacts of 
global warming and recommends a EU policy goal of emissions neutrality by 2050. 
46 See M. Carducci, La ricerca dei caratteri differenziali della “giustizia climatica”, cit. 
47 The expression reservation to science echoes the concept of reservation to legislation (or 
legislative reservation). 
48 See M. Carducci, La ricerca dei caratteri differenziali della “giustizia climatica”, cit. 
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In consideration of the foregoing, it seems clear that policy-makers and 
judges have to found their decisions on science when taking into account climate 
change issues. The fundamental profile to illustrate to a court when claiming to 
take adequate measures should be anchored to these UNFCCC provisions, because 
its clauses are the constitutive sources of the legal relation formed by human 
activity and climate change49.  
The elements related to scientific facts assume a normative character that 
directs the interpretative activity of the judges: the greater the consensus on 
scientific facts, the narrower the judicial discretion. Scientific climate sources are 
to be considered as parameters to which courts have to refer to understand when 
and how climate change is altered by human activities50. Hence, no wonder if the 
plaintiffs turn to scientific facts to argue a strict link between a particular source 
of greenhouse gas emissions and an extreme weather event and correlated 
harms51. The general consensus on attribution science allows the applicants to ask 
for a limitation of the volume of emissions or for the invalidation of rules that 
undermine the purpose of reducing emissions as a consequence of their 
fundamental rights, for example the rights to life, health, and respect for private 
and family life.  
Thanks to the robust scientific consensus on the anthropogenic roots of 
climate change, in the Urgenda case it has been possible for the Supreme Court to 
affirm that the government is not meeting its obligations to protect the residents 
from dangerous climate change and has violated the general duty of care because 
its greenhouse gas reduction goal is not sufficiently ambitious. The IPCC’s 
assessments are at the basis of the incontrovertible evidence of climate change as 
a «real and immediate risk», in the sense that the risk does not have to materialise 
in the short term but it is directly threatening the persons involved52. In this case, 
attribution science has played the function of the parameter of the objective good 
faith of the State, by furnishing evidence of the harms incurred by citizens as a 
result of climate change. It has also been used to provide information on the 
emission reductions necessary to meet the 2°C target53.  
Specifically, the Supreme Court’s reasoning begins by introducing the facts 
and, first of all, the most relevant ones, namely climate change and its 
 
49 See M. Carducci, La ricerca dei caratteri differenziali della “giustizia climatica”, cit. 
50 On the reservation to science and science as a interposed parameter of constitutionality in 
Italy with specific reference to the medical field, see C. Casonato, La scienza come parametro 
interposto di costituzionalità, in Rivista AIC, 2, 2016, 6 ff.  
51 See J. Setzer, R. Byrnes, Global trends in climate change litigation: 2019 snapshot, London, 2019, 
1, at www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/publication/global-trends-in-climate-change-
litigation-2019-snapshot/. 
52 For the analysis of the case Urgenda Foundation v the State of the Netherlands decided by the 
Supreme Court in December 2019, see A. Nollkaemper, L. Burgers, A New Classic in Climate 
Change Litigation: The Dutch Supreme Court Decision in the Urgenda Case, in EJIL: Talk!, 2020, 
at www.ejiltalk.org/a-new-classic-in-climate-change-litigation-the-dutch-supreme-court-
decision-in-the-urgenda-case/; M.F. Cavalcanti, M.J. Terstegge, The Urgenda Case: The Dutch 
Path towards a new Climate Constitutionalism, in this Review, DPCE online, 2, 2020. 
53 See M. Carducci, La ricerca dei caratteri differenziali della “giustizia climatica”, cit.; M. Burger, 
J. Wentz, R. Horton, op. cit., 186.  
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consequences. It proceeds affirming that there has long been a consensus in 
climate science and in the international community that the Earth’s average 
temperature may not rise by more than 2°C compared to the pre-industrial era. 
Then, it considers of particular importance some legal and extra-legal sources in 
order to infer the percentage of emission reduction in the next decades, i.e. the 
IPCC’s fourth and fifth reports, the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, the climate 
conferences, the UN Environment Programme’s reports, and the EU climate 
policy.  
In continuing its reasoning, the Court wonders what the obligation on part 
of the State to take adequate measures to reduce emissions means in concrete 
terms, stressing that the State rightly argues that the 25-40% target indicated in 
the IPCC’s fourth report is not a binding rule. However, due to the high degree of 
international consensus regarding the 25-40% target, the Court affirms that the 
Netherlands has an individual responsibility to comply with its international 
obligation. In giving substance to the positive obligation of the duty of care under 
Articles 2 and 8 ECHR54, the Netherlands has to take into account supported 
scientific insights and internationally accepted standards. Then, the Court 
highlights the urgent necessity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions on the basis 
of the IPCC’s findings, recognising that the State has not provided any evidence 
into which measures it intends to take in the coming years. As a consequence, the 
order which the District Court issued to the State and which was confirmed by the 
Court of Appeal, requiring the State to increase its emissions reduction target by 
at least 25% (instead of 23%) by 202055 according to the IPCC’s recommendations 
for developed countries, is allowed to stand.  
In essence, when can a climate tort committed by the State be judicially 
recognised? When the State decides to ignore two aspects. Firstly, that climate 
change is a notorious fact unquestionable by the courts. As illustrated, it is an 
anthropogenic-induced phenomenon authoritatively attested by attribution 
science. Secondly, that the goal of limiting the temperature increase is a legal fact, 
accepted by States through the ratification of international accords. Therefore, 
each State has an obligation to achieve the results precisely indicated in 
quantitative terms (1,5°/2°C) and time limits (before 2030).  
Having clarified these aspects, it follows that climate litigation is to 
guarantee the fulfilment of international obligations. These are further specified 
through scientific facts to which the accords make reference and on which the 
States agree, contributing to form a general consensus on them56. These 
assumptions should avoid the risk that courts decline to judge a climate lawsuit 
invoking the principle of separation of powers, as has already occurred in some 
 
54 Art. 2 ECHR regards the right to life, and 8 ECHR regards the right to respect for private 
and family life. 
55 In the EU, the Commission has determined a binding target to cut emissions by at least 
40% below 1990 levels by 2030. Currently, the Commission aims to revise the EU’s 2030 
emission reduction target; its intention is to propose a target by at least 50%. See 
ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030_en. 
56 See M. Carducci, Il clima tra diritti e democrazia, 2019, available at 
www.donnescienza.it/convegno-donne-e-scienza-2019-lecce-14-16-novembre/. 
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countries57. The rights-based argument also serves to attract a suit in the field of 
law instead of that of politics, requiring courts to decide to. 
4. Climate change litigation in the European Union and the Carvalho case  
The EU and its member States coordinate their policies and set common gas 
emission reduction targets on the basis of the EU legal framework and 
international commitments. To date, almost all the cases that are generally 
considered climate change lawsuits have involved the implementation of the 
Emission Trading System (ETS).  
The ETS is a market instrument, the functioning of which is determined by 
the maintenance of cost-effective and economically efficient conditions and the 
safeguarding of economic development, employment and competition in the EU. 
This mechanism has generated a price for greenhouse gas emissions through its 
cap-and-trade system. It entails that operators of power and industrial 
installations in the ETS sector are subject to a limit on emissions and have to 
acquire and retire emission permits for each tonne of greenhouse gases emitted 
during the production process58. The non-ETS sectors (such as transport, waste, 
agriculture, buildings) are regulated by the Effort Sharing Decision (EDS) that 
sets differentiated national greenhouse gas emission targets each year, reflecting 
the principle of fairness and burden-sharing considerations in EU climate policy. 
The ETS has given rise to several tens of judicial controversies, especially 
dealing with planning applications or allocation of emissions allowances. It has 
been noted that the types of litigation that the ETS is principally exposed to 
regard the clarification of the scope of the Commission’s discretion concerning the 
review of the member States’ emissions allowance caps, the so-called National 
Allocation Plans (NAPs), and also issues such as the quantity of allowances 
allocated to specific member States or delays in the Commission’s communication 
of its decisions.  
To a great extent, these claims have been brought forward by industries and 
have been rejected by the CJEU due to the lack of direct and individual concern59. 
This is an essential requirement to challenge directly an act through action for 
 
57 For example, in the United States, the United Kingdom and in Canada, courts declined to 
recognise issues arising from climate change on the basis of the principle of separation of 
powers. See E.C. Fisher, E.A.K. Scotford, E. Barritt, The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate 
Change, in Modern Law Review, 2, 2017, 183. On the contrary, the courts involved in the case 
Urgenda rejected the State argument that the order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
violates the separation of powers. The Supreme Court highlighted that the order does not 
interfere in the political decision-making process, given that only the legislator has the power 
to determine the content of the statutory provision to enact. 
58 See J. Delbeke, P. Vis, EU climate leadership in a rapidly changing world, in Iid. (eds), op. cit., 
18 ff.; and D. Meadows, Y. Slingenberg, P. Zapfel, EU ETS: Pricing carbon to drive cost-effective 
reductions across Europe, in J. Delbeke, P. Vis (eds), op. cit., 26 ff. 
59 See J. van Zeben, Implementation challenges for emission trading schemes: the role of litigation, in 
S.E. Weishaar (ed.), Research Handbook on Emissions Trading, Cheltenham, 2016, 245 ff.; S. 
Bogojević, EU climate change litigation: all quiet on the Luxembourgian front?, in G. Van Calster, 
W. Vanderberghe, L. Reins (eds), Research Handbook on Climate Change Mitigation Law, 
Cheltenham, 2015, 543 ff.  
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annulment under Art. 263(4) TFEU, which considers natural and legal persons as 
non-privileged applicants who may have standing only under certain conditions60. 
Nevertheless, the claims on part of industries have continued. The constant flux 
of lawsuits has been interpreted as a tool to protest against EU institutions for the 
ETS mechanism and the recent abolition of the NAPs has been considered an 
indirect effect of this litigation strategy61. 
Natural persons and NGOs also sought to challenge EU institutions before 
the CJEU in the recent case Peter Sabo and Others v European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union, dubbed the EU Biomass case62. In March 2019, plaintiffs 
from Estonia, Ireland, France, Romania, Slovakia, and the United States filed a 
complaint under Art. 263(4) TFEU arguing that the 2018 Renewable Energy 
Directive (RED II) would devastate forests and increase emissions by promoting 
burning forest wood as renewable and carbon neutral resource. The claim referred 
to scientific evidence to demonstrate that wood-burning power plants pump more 
carbon into the atmosphere per unit of energy than coal plants. In the opinion of 
the plaintiffs, the EU policy did not take into account the emissions from burning 
biomass fuels for heat or energy, making it appear that they are more climate-
friendly than fossil fuels. Hence, the applicants contended that the inclusion of 
forest biomass as a renewable energy source within the RED II violates Art. 191 
TFEU. Moreover, the claimants submitted that the RED II is incompatible with 
the Charter obligations, since they had experienced harms to their health, 
livelihoods, communities and cultural traditions as a result of logging, wood pellet 
manufacturing, and the production of biomass energy. For these reasons, they 
sought an annulment of the RED II’s provisions relating to forest biomass, leaving 
in force the other parts of the Directive. The case was rejected for lack of standing 
in May 2020.  
A further recent lawsuit filed by individuals has challenged the legitimacy of 
EU climate legislation for having breached higher-ranking law, which includes 
human rights and international law. Unlike the previous legal disputes, the 
Carvalho case falls into the strict classification of climate change litigation last 
illustrated in § 2. In 2018, the alleged invalidity of three EU acts implementing 
the 2030 emissions reduction target – the Emissions Trading Directive, the 
Climate Action Regulation, and the Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
Regulation63 – was brought before the CJEU. The applicants are ten families from 
 
60 Art. 263(4) TFEU states that: «Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid 
down in the first and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to 
that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act 
which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures». 
61 See J. van Zeben, op. cit., 250. 
62 Case T-141/19. The application is available at eubiomasscase.org/the-case/. 
63 The contested acts, adopted on the basis of Art. 192(1) TFEU, are: Directive (EU) 2018/410 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2018 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments, and 
Decision (EU) 2015/1814; Regulation (EU) 2018/841 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 May 2018 on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land 
use, land use change and forestry in the 2030 climate and energy framework, and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 and Decision No 529/2013/EU; Regulation (EU) 2018/842 
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Portugal, Germany, France, Italy, Romania and even from Kenya and Fiji given 
that non-EU citizens are affected by emissions originated in the EU and 
authorised by EU acts as well; among them is also included the Swedish 
association Sáminuorra, which represents young indigenous Saami.  
The applicants sustain that the EU’s target of reducing emissions by 2030 
by at least 40% compared to 1990 levels is insufficient in order to prevent impacts 
upon their livelihoods caused by climate change. Hence, they allege that the target 
set by the contested acts should be nullified, as they are in contrast with the 
Charter, the TFEU, the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, and other international 
conventions. Additionally, with the goal of preventing a legislative vacuum in case 
of annulment, on the basis of Art. 264(2) TFEU the claimants request that the 
invalid provisions continue to apply until their revision is made in conformity with 
the higher-ranking law. Furthermore, in an action for damages under Art. 340 
TFEU, they seek compensation for their alleged individual losses in small-scale 
agricultural and tourism business in the form of an injunction ordering the 
Parliament and the Council to adopt measures requiring emission reduction by 
2030 by at least 50% to 60%. Unlike the Urgenda case, where the plaintiffs invoked 
a general interest and were not damaged directly, in this lawsuit the complainants 
are indeed experiencing the negative effects generated by human-induced climate 
change. 
Regarding the factual context of the case, in support of their claims drawn 
from scientific and economic studies, mainly from the IPCC’s reports, the 
applicants present a significant volume of evidence. They contend that their rights 
have been violated or are at risk of violation due to climate change and its effects, 
which take the form of megafires, higher temperatures, lower rainfall and drought 
conditions, retreat of snow and ice, glacial melting, rising sea levels and storm 
surges and associated erosion, severe cyclones, and loss of food. They emphasise 
that «Scientifically, this statement necessitates what is called “detection and 
attribution” of the “human climate signal”. The IPCC has defined this concept 
since its 3rd Assessment Report (2001). It essentially allows climate scientists to 
link an observed phenomenon to man-made greenhouse gas emissions and the 
resulting increased radiative forcing. […] A range of different methodological 
approaches are applied for detection and attribution, including statistical 
approaches based on observed changes, distinct climate modelling studies, as well 
as hybrid approaches». The applicants assume that the defendants do not 
challenge these findings and facts since the EU has accepted the essential 
connection between the emission of greenhouse gases, increases in temperature, 
and dangerous climate change through its participation in international 
agreements and its legislative acts.  
An interesting argument here exposed regards the issue of calculating the 
emissions budget. As has been stressed, it is «a contentious and relatively 
 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on binding annual greenhouse 
gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action 
to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement and amending Regulation (EU) No 
525/2013. 
 The role of science in environmental  
and climate change adjudications 
 
 
DPCE online, 2020/2 – Saggi  
ISSN: 2037-6677 
1437 
unmapped area of law that implicates core questions of historic and current 
responsibility, social and economic capability, and justice and equity»64. In order 
to gather scientific advice, the plaintiffs invite the Court to consider the possibility 
to commission an expert’s report in relation with the damages caused by climate 
change to the applicants, the total budget of emissions available for use by the EU, 
or the measures that the EU could feasibly adopt to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions. Regarding this option, it has been noted that in EU courts the scientific 
expertise has an extremely limited application since the facts are mostly 
undisputed, resulting from evidence provided by the member State involved65.  
In any case, the applicants argue that the Commission failed to identify 
legitimate concerns (such as preserving employment) when the range of reduction 
target to be adopted in the three contested acts was chosen. The 40% reduction 
target was corroborated by the Impact Assessment of the Commission of January 
2014, in which different scenarios were illustrated. The scenarios based on 
emission reductions below 35% and above 45% were discarded at an early stage, 
without taking into account a range of evidence as to the feasibility of introducing 
deeper reductions. According to the plaintiffs’ view, deeper reductions would have 
been preferred ultimately if the Commission wanted to consider more ambitious 
targets. Given that the claimants sustain that the emissions budget has not been 
properly calculated, they suggest methods for determining it in order to ensure 
that the EU legal framework complies with international agreements.  
With reference to the alleged violation of fundamental rights, the Charter 
provisions invoked by the plaintiffs include the right to life (Art. 2), to health (Art. 
3), to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen or accepted occupation (Art. 
15), to own, use, dispose of and bequeath lawfully acquired possessions (Art. 17), 
to equal treatment of young people and people living in developing countries (Art. 
20), and to the welfare of children (Art. 24). In this regard, it seems interesting to 
note that, according to the claimants, the recognition of the right to a healthy 
environment at EU level might help them but, since EU primary law does not 
contain such right66, they uphold that it is in any event not essential. This is 
because the specific rights they refer to can be interpreted as encompassing those 
climate conditions that are necessary for the exercise of a right67. Moreover, it 
might be easier to address climate change concerns through well-founded rights 
 
64 See T. Etty et al., The End of a Decade and the Down of a Climate Resistance, in Transnational 
Environmental Law, 1, 2020, 6.  
65 However, scientific evidence can become relevant in the hypothesis of a manifest error of 
appreciation. See C. Sobotta, The Court of Justice of the European Union, 2019 EUFJE 
Conference on “The Role of Science in Environmental Adjudication”, 2019, 2 f., at 
www.eufje.org/images/docConf/hel2019/EUFJE_Questionnaire_2019_CJEU_Sobotta.pdf. 
66 As indicated in § 1, Art. 37 Charter provides for environmental protection conceived as a 
policy objective. The EU does not recognise the right to a healthy environment, as the 
environment is a collective good. Using the language of rights would be misleading since 
human rights are designed to protect the members of a political community individually.  
67 See G. Winter, Armando Carvalho and Others v. EU: Invoking Human Rights and the Paris 
Agreement for Better Climate Protection Legislation, in Transnational Environmental Law, 1, 2020, 
143. 
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than through the not yet well-defined right to a healthy environment at 
international level. 
In May 2019, the General Court (Second Chamber) dismissed as 
inadmissible the lawsuit for procedural grounds, because the plaintiffs lacked 
standing for failure to show a direct and individual concern. The Court stated that 
they are not sufficiently or directly affected by the EU acts to challenge them, 
since they are not identified by the acts as addressees thereof. In particular, the 
judges wrote that «It is true that every individual is likely to be affected one way 
or another by climate change [...] However, the fact that the effects of climate 
change may be different for one person than they are for another does not mean 
that, for that reason, there exists standing to bring an action against a measure of 
general application» (para. 50). The Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument 
that the interpretation of the concept of individual concern is not compatible with 
the fundamental right to effective judicial protection under Art. 47 Charter. 
5. The issue of legal standing and the appeal in the Carvalho case 
In a global perspective, the issue of access to judicial remedies granted to NGOs 
and natural persons is one of the most problematic aspects in environmental and 
climate matters. Since in these cases the interests are diffused, fragmented, and 
collective, thus pertaining to everyone and no one at the same time, if an action 
group or a person is requested to demonstrate having a direct and individual 
concern in a lawsuit, very frequently this is equivalent to impeding access to 
courts. Bearing in mind this problem as well, the 1998 UNECE Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters (the so-called Aarhus Convention) has been 
designed to empower citizens and civil society organisations, in the belief that 
these three pillars represent an expansive notion of democracy. As to the standing 
in courts, Art. 9(3) of the Convention affirms that «each Party shall ensure that 
[…] members of the public have access to administrative or judicial procedures 
to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities which 
contravene provisions of its national law relating to the environment».  
Since the EU concluded this multilateral environmental agreement through 
Decision 2005/370 and in 2006 adopted the so-called Aarhus Regulation to 
implement its obligations by laying down rules to apply to EU institutions and 
bodies68, one wonders to what extent the EU conforms to the international 
standard. It is well known that the legality of an act can be challenged directly 
before the CJEU through action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU or indirectly 
before national judiciary through the preliminary reference procedure according 
to Art. 267 TFEU. Moreover, the Aarhus Regulation provides that environmental 
NGOs may file a request for the internal review of administrative acts of individual 
 
68 Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters to Community institutions and bodies. 
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scope under environmental law adopted by an EU institution or body. This 
mechanism is meant to facilitate qualified entities’ access to justice who would not 
have it on the basis of Art. 263(4) TFEU. Despite that, natural and legal persons 
seeking to challenge directly the legality of EU environmental or climate acts 
through the remedies currently available still encounter significant procedural 
obstacles. Many scholars deem that the CJEU’s test adopted on standing is too 
restrictive and stress that it is even stricter than in any EU member State69. It 
should be said that even member States are not particularly inclined to broaden 
access to judicial remedies to the public. Resistance in this context is made evident 
by the fact that the EU has never been able to adopt a directive on access to justice 
in environmental matters for the oppositions encountered in the consultation 
phase70. 
The Court of Justice clarified the conditions for demonstrating an individual 
concern in the case Plaumann & Co. v Commission of the European Economic 
Community (case-25/62) issued in 1963. Since then, the so-called Plaumann 
formula has never been softened in the environmental sector71, requiring that 
«Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to be 
individually concerned if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes 
which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are 
differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes 
them individually just as in the case of the person addressed». However, it has 
been noted that several EU environmental measures are addressed to protect 
interests of a diffused nature and hence do not confer any rights on individuals, 
thus leaving uncovered certain sectors by judicial remedies72. 
The consequence of this criterion for substantiating an individual interest is 
that the EU judicial system is not fitted with a remedy to easily allow persons and 
NGOs to challenge the legality of EU environmental and climate acts directly. 
The CJEU justifies its approach asserting that «it is for the national court, in order 
to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by EU environmental 
law, to interpret its national law in a way which, to the fullest extent possible, is 
consistent with the objectives laid down in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus 
Convention»73. From this, one understands that the CJEU’s objective is that of 
 
69 Among others, see J. Ebbesson, Comparative Introduction, in Id. (ed.), Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters in the EU, The Hague, 2002, 27; R. Mastroianni, L’effettività della tutela 
giurisdizionale alla prova della Carta dei diritti fondamentali, in A.A.V.V., Liber Amicorum in onore 
di Antonio Tizzano. De la Cour CECA à la Cour de l’Union: le long parcours de la justice européenne, 
Torino, 2018, 594 ff. 
70 See N. De Dominicis, L’accesso alla giustizia in materia ambientale. Profili di diritto europeo, 
Padova, 2016, 44, 70 ff. 
71 Conversely, the Plaumann formula has been softened in other matters, such as competition 
law. 
72 See M. Eliantonio, The role of NGOs in environmental implementation conflicts: ‘stuck in the 
middle’ between infringement proceedings and preliminary rulings?, in Journal of European 
Integration, 6, 2018, 758.  
73 See the so-called Brown bear case, Lesoochranárske Zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo životného 
prostredia Slovenskej republiky, 8 March 2011, case C-240/09, § 50. 
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reducing any possible intervention of individuals, advocating the principle of 
judicial subsidiarity and the preliminary reference procedure.  
As a result of this state of affairs, on a number of occasions the Aarhus 
Compliance Committee, i.e. the mechanism put in place to review the Parties’ 
conformity with the UNECE Convention, has shared the concern expressed by 
various commentators with regard to the conditions for standing of natural and 
legal persons in the EU. In 2011, the Committee affirmed that the CJEU’s 
interpretation on individual concern was too strict to meet the criteria of the 
Convention, recommending that EU institutions take steps to overcome the 
shortcomings reflected in the case law in providing the public concerned with 
access to justice in environmental matters74.  
The EU replied that the Parties to the Convention have a margin of 
appreciation as to how they implement Art. 9(3) and that the EU institutions 
exercise this margin according to the Aarhus Regulation. Subsequently, in 2017, 
the Committee reasserted its considerations after having analysed the case law 
issued in the years that had passed since its first recommendation75. A few months 
later, the EU Council of Ministers adopted its decision on the EU’s position to 
hold at the sixth session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Aarhus Convention. 
It refused to endorse the original proposal of the Commission, according to which 
the findings of the Aarhus Committee were to be rejected, and decided to take note 
of them. However, in respect of the separation of powers, it did not give 
instructions to the CJEU to open the door to individual claims76. 
In March 2020 the EU Commission undertook a step to amend the Aarhus 
Regulation with the objective of improving access to judicial remedies at the EU 
and national levels. The Roadmap follows the requests made by the Council and 
the Parliament to ensure EU compliance with the UNECE Convention as well as 
the European Green Deal Communication of December 2019 in which the 
Commission committed to considering this issue77. From the reading of the few 
lines of the Roadmap available so far, it seems there is still room for improvement. 
In fact, a revision of the Regulation to broaden the scope of the review mechanism 
is suggested. This revision should encompass non-legislative regulatory acts (in 
addition to administrative acts of individual scope) and include provisions of laws 
 
74 See Findings and recommendations of the Compliance Committee with regard to 
communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part I) concerning compliance by the European Union, 
adopted on 14 April 2011, at www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-
32/Findings/C32Findings27April2011. 
75 See Findings and recommendations of the Compliance Committee with regard to 
communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part II) concerning compliance by the European Union, 
adopted on 17 March 2017, at www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-
32/Findings/C32_EU_Findings_as_adopted_advance_unedited_version. 
76 See N. Notaro, M. Pagano, The Interplay of International and EU Environmental Law, in I. 
Govaere, S. Garben (eds), The Interface Between EU and International Law. Contemporary 
Reflections, Oxford, 174 f. 
77 A study has been commissioned in 2019 to explore ways to comply with the Aarhus 
Convention. See Study on EU implementation of the Aarhus Convention in the area of access 
to justice in environmental matters, Final report September 2019, is available at 
ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/Final_study_EU_implemention_environmental_mat
ters_2019.pdf. 
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relating to the environment (instead of the current formulation, according to 
which the Regulation covers acts «under» environmental law)78.  
During this lapse of time, the General Court’s order in the case Carvalho has 
been appealed. The appellants have requested the European Court of Justice to set 
aside the order, to declare that their application is admissible, and to refer the case 
back to the General Court for judgement in the substance of the matter. They 
sustain that the General Court erred in finding that the claimants do not satisfy 
the principles stated in the Plaumann test. Alternatively, they allege that the Court 
erred in not adapting the test in light of the compelling challenge of climate 
change. Other two grounds make reference to the denial to the Sáminuorra 
association to have standing and to the inadmissibility of non-contractual 
liability79. This appeal provides interesting theoretical insights on the issue of locus 
standi referred to associations and non-EU citizens. 
As for associations and environmental NGOs, their role in the EU legal 
order is quite complex for the obstacles they face in the implementation of disputes 
for environmental or climate change infringements, being forced to rely on 
national authorities only. It is settled case law that actions for annulment brought 
by associations have been held to be admissible in at least three kinds of 
circumstances: firstly, when a legal provision expressly grants a series of 
procedural powers to trade associations; secondly, when the association represents 
the interests of its members, who would themselves be entitled to bring 
proceedings; and, thirdly, when the association is distinguished individually 
because its own interests as an association are affected, in particular because its 
negotiating position has been affected by the measure in respect of whose 
annulment is sought80. Several commentators highlight that this scenario leads to 
undermine the content of Art. 47 Charter devoted to the right to an effective 
remedy before a tribunal.  
In the Carvalho case, the appellants argue that the members of the 
Sáminuorra association are all components of families who herd reindeers and 
hence are individually concerned. Alternatively, they stress that the association 
itself is indeed concerned since it represents a common good of its members, i.e. 
the traditional right of the Saami people to make use of public and private grazing 
lands for their reindeer herds. Where a community shares resources and income, 
it may be alien for its members to act as individuals. Therefore, this association 
would be different from the familiar type of trade association made up of the sum 
of individual member interests. Sáminuorra represents the collective good of its 
components which is different from (and more valuable than) the sum of individual 
interests. Insisting that the criterion of individual concern needs to be proven for 
each of the members of such an association would impede access to justice if 
 
78 The Roadmap is available at ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-
say/initiatives/12165-Access-to-Justice-in-Environmental-matters. 
79 Case C-565/19P. The appeal submitted to the European Court of Justice is available at 
peoplesclimatecase.caneurope.org/documents/. 
80 See Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 23 November 1999, Unión de Pequeños 
Agricultores (UPA) v Council of the European Union, case T-173/98, para. 47. 
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common goods were endangered. For this reason, the claimants suggest that the 
Court should consider this as a fourth type of action, namely the action of a 
community defending a common good81. 
As for non-EU citizens, their standing would be justified by the fact that the 
Charter opens to relevant rights irrespective of personal or geographical scope 
and that this is a common practice in domestic judiciaries when environmental 
issues are at stake. Moreover, at international level, human rights have been 
interpreted adopting a transnational perspective, so that individuals living outside 
a territory may bring a claim within the jurisdiction where an environmental harm 
has originated. Furthermore, in the EU, companies situated in third countries have 
been allowed to rely on freedom of trade, fundamental rights, and the protection 
of legitimate expectations82. In this case, families living in developing countries 
such as Kenya and Fiji would be affected by the gas emissions from the EU 
member States. Their involvement is part of a tendency to challenge laws 
highlighting the impact of climate change towards the most vulnerable groups. 
We will have to wait a few more months to know the decision of the 
European Court of Justice on this appeal. 
6. Towards the judicial recognition of the right to live in a stable climate 
system in the European legal space? 
Regardless of whether the Carvalho case is declared admissible by the European 
Court of Justice, it raises a number of speculations on the potential of litigation 
strategy to recognise EU and member States’ climate liability and to contribute to 
strengthening measures to tackle the climate crisis in Europe.  
Although there can be a common goal shared by NGOs and individuals from 
different countries to sue governments claiming the respect of international 
agreements imposing the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, each lawsuit 
must be examined following the rules and the legal culture of the State where the 
claim is filed. In this vein, two factors have contributed to the Urgenda primacy as 
a ground-breaking judicial precedent: the possibility to launch class actions on 
part of interest groups, and a judiciary not willing to lower the level of protection 
of fundamental rights in such a highly impactful issue with the pretext of the 
separation of powers. The human rights discourse seems essential in this type of 
lawsuit as it pushes away from the courtroom any attempt to attract the matter 
within the political arena.  
Moreover, the science of climate change attribution may not be put in 
question by the defendants in those countries where the UNFCCC and its 
correlated agreements have to be complied with. It follows that a sufficient causal 
link can be assumed to exist between the emissions budget of a certain country 
and the effects produced by climate change in order to recognise State liability. 
State obligation to face climate change can be weighed through the lens of human 
 
81 See the appeal, op. cit., 18 ff.; G. Winter, op. cit., 160. 
82 See G. Winter, op. cit., 142. 
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rights standards and the general consensus on scientific knowledge, in which the 
latter provides judges with evidence indispensable to clarify the factual 
background of the case, to establish the causal link, and to reach a decision.  
Ensuring the widest possible access to justice is therefore the major 
guarantee for claimants to be heard by judges. We live in an epoch in which the 
adverse effects of increasing levels of greenhouse gas emissions are expected to 
intensify and too many governments are still inactive in the matter. In the 
meantime, current legislations may bar natural and legal persons from suing for 
climate change-related injuries due to restrictions on standing. In this context, a 
very urgent issue to tackle on part of EU and national institutions should be that 
of granting effective access to judicial remedies in climate (and also environmental) 
matters.  
By extending the perspective at global level, several arguments in support 
of States’ climate liability have been put forward, such as the principle of due 
diligence, the public trust doctrine, the duty of care, the human rights discourse, 
the rights of nature, the responsibility towards future generations. Climate 
liability itself is an evolving concept, subject to further jurisprudential guidelines. 
It may also refer to private companies and be extended so as to affirm an obligation 
to protect vulnerable peoples or specific ecosystems, such as the Amazon 
rainforest83. 
The novelty represented by climate change litigation in the constitutional 
field has and probably will have an interesting ripple effect on the evolution of 
legal concepts and rights. As has been stressed in relation to the duty of care, 
«L’affaire Urgenda par exemple, renouvelle la notion du duty of care, jusqu’ici 
seulement utilisée dans le cadre du droit international – pour désigner l’obligation 
d’un État de ne pas porter préjudice à un autre État – en lui donnant des contours 
très précis, et en l’inscrivant désormais dans le droit du changement climatique en 
tant qu’obligation à la charge de l’État vis-à-vis de ses citoyens. La redéfinition de 
cette notion, de plus en plus mobilisée dans des affaires concernant la santé et 
l’environnement, permet de confirmer la responsabilité publique et surtout 
l’obligation d’agir de l’État face à une menace documentée, bien qu’incertaine»84. 
Just as the Urgenda claim has been a model for the plaintiffs in the Carvalho 
case and for the lawyers of other lawsuits actually pending in front of domestic 
jurisdictions, as in France, Ireland and Belgium, so could the reasoning in the 
Urgenda decision be a source of inspiration for foreign courts. It has already 
happened with an order of the Australian Land and Environment Court that 
makes references to the decision of The Hague Court of Appeal85.  
 
83 See M. Torre-Schaub (dir.), Les dynamiques du contentieux climatique. Usages et mobilisations 
du droit pour la cause climatique, Rapport final de recherche, 2019, 72 and 75, at www.gip-
recherche-justice.fr/publication/les-dynamiques-du-contentieux-climatique-usages-et-
mobilisation-du-droit-face-a-la-cause-climatique-2/. 
84 See M. Torre-Schaub (dir.), op. cit., 93. 
85 See the case Gloucester Resources Limited v Minister for Planning, [2019] NSWLEC 7. 
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Even the engagement of the ECtHR cannot be ruled out as a possibility86. 
So far, issues regarding climate change-related cases have never been tackled by 
this authoritative European Court, but it already has an established practice of 
interpreting a number of substantive human rights as incorporating 
environmental considerations, including the right to life, the right to a fair trial 
and the right to respect for family and private life, resulting from environmental 
hazards, such as air pollution (this is because any attempt to draft an additional 
protocol to the ECHR concerning the autonomous right to a healthy environment 
has always failed).  
In that event, could the Court of Strasbourg be more activist than that of 
Luxembourg? It is worth bearing in mind that the ECtHR is very cautious in 
environmental matters87. This notwithstanding, one may wonder whether there 
will be room for the ECtHR to recognise a sufficient common consensus of the 
party States on a real and imminent threat produced by climate change, and to 
condemn those that have not prevented the infringement of fundamental rights. 
And also: how would it be possible for the party States to justify their inaction or 
to challenge the IPCC’s findings after having accepted the existence of a direct 
link between the emission of greenhouse gases and climate change? In this 
hypothesis, a general consensus should be recognised on the basis of the IPCC’s 
reports, thus reducing the margin of appreciation, which is the space of manoeuvre 
that the Court grants to national authorities. Consequently, it could be very 
difficult for a State to exonerate itself for not having taken adequate measures, 
leading to a possible decision in favour of the applicants. 
Another issue that is emerging in the comparative panorama regards the 
notion of the right to live in a stable climate system. It has to be stressed that 
neither the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in the Urgenda case nor the Carvalho 
application in front of the CJEU make explicit reference to it. Instead, it was 
previously invoked by the plaintiffs in the US Juliana case, who alleged that the 
right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life is a fundamental 
constitutional right. Although in 2016 the District Court of Oregon issued a 
landmark opinion sustaining this instance and allowing the case to proceed to trial, 
in January 2020 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal in Portland dismissed it for 
lack of standing88. A petition for rehearing en banc the case was submitted in 
March 2020 and is still pending. 
 
86 A crowdfunding initiative to bring a case before the ECtHR was launched in 2017 on part 
of a group of Portuguese children inspired by the Urgenda case. See D. Hodas, US climate 
change adjudication: the epic journey from a petition for rulemaking to national greenhouse gas 
regulation, in C. Voigt, Z. Makuch, Courts and the Environment, Cheltenham, 2018, 343. 
87 On the Court’s lack of ambition and courage in environmental matters, see E. Lambert, The 
Environment and Human Rights. Introductory Report to the High-Level Conference “Environmental 
Protection and Human Rights”, 2020, 15, at rm.coe.int/report-e-lambert-en/16809c827f. 
88 See M.C. Blumm, M.C. Wood, No Ordinary Lawsuit: Climate Change, Due Process, and the 
Public Trust Doctrine, in Am. U. L. Rev., 1, 2017, 1 ff.; H. Aidun, M. Libby, Juliana in the World: 
Comparing the Ninth Circuit’s Decision to Foreign Rights-Based Climate Litigation, in Climate Law 
Blog, March 13th 2020, in blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2020/03/13/juliana-in-the-
world-comparing-the-ninth-circuits-decision-to-foreign-rights-based-climate-litigation/. 
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Legal scholars question whether the right to a stable climate can be 
considered an autonomous right. Most of them seem to agree on the fact that it 
may be inferred by other established human rights, as the right to life primarily, 
and to health and respect for private and family life as further corollaries. There is 
also someone who argues that a human right to a stable climate may be derived 
from the right to an adequate environment89. 
The right to live in a stable climate and the right to a healthy environment 
have a point in common, as both may be inferred by the right to life and may be 
further substantiated by other fundamental rights. Moreover, the environment is 
also seriously affected by changes of climate. Precisely for this reason, a stable 
climate system is considered a component of the right to a healthy environment90. 
Nevertheless, inferring the right to climate from the right to environment does 
not seem a proper interpretative choice from the legal point of view, in the light 
of the above-mentioned differences between the concepts of climate and 
environment and of the distinct legal bases that regulate these matters. Rather, 
the violation of the right to climate might be more conveniently alleged basing 
this harm on other fundamental rights already existent in national and 
international law. In this perspective, the protection of life and the respect for 
private and family life must be interpreted as including the right to live in a stable 
climate system. Suffice it to think of the usefulness of Articles 2 and 8 ECHR in 
the Urgenda case and of the fact that similar provisions are foreseen in every 
constitutional system and also in the EU legal order, enshrined in Articles 2 and 
7 Charter.  
The circulation of legal arguments on the right to live in a stable climate 
system is at its infancy stage and an increase in terms of dissemination of ideas 
and principles among lawyers, legal scholars and judges can be predicted. On the 
resort to non-domestic legal ideas in this matter, one can recall the lawsuit known 
as Affaire du Siècle, brought forward by the Administrative Court of Paris in May 
2019 and still pending. The team of lawyers and experts has been inspired by the 
Urgenda case as well as the Juliana case and the US legal doctrine. The plaintiffs 
sustain the existence of a general principle of law recognising a subjective right, 
namely the right to live in a sustainable climate system. Their scope is to persuade 
the Court to recognise a specific climate-related general principle in order to 
consolidate the obligation to tackle climate change and to open the possibility to 
challenge any act or omission inconsistent with climate protection91. This profile 
seems to clarify why the claim for the affirmation of the right to climate should be 
kept separate from the vindication of other fundamental rights. 
 
89 Some speculations are made by D. Bell, Climate change and human rights, in WIREs Climate 
Change, 4, 2013, 159 ff. See also S.R. Foster, P. Galizzi, Human rights and climate change: building 
synergies for a common future, in D. Farber, M. Peeters (eds), op. cit., 43 ff. 
90 An analysis of the development of climate change litigation in various jurisdictions in which 
parties have sought to invoke environmental rights, as the right to a quality environment, is 
made by B.J. Preston, The Evolving Role of Environmental Rights in Climate Change Litigation, 
in Chinese J. of Environmental Law, 2, 2018, 131 ff. 
91 See C. Cournil, A. Le Dylio, P. Mougeolle, L’affaire du Siècle: French Climate Litigation between 
Continuity and Legal Innovation, in Carbon & Climate Law Rev., 1, 2020, 40 ff. 
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In turn, the Italian lawsuit that should be launched in Autumn 2020, dubbed 
the Giudizio Universale case, finds its sources of inspiration in the Urgenda and 
Affaire du Siècle cases. The promoters of this judicial initiative intend to call for the 
recognition of the human right to the climate, which incorporates the principle of 
neminem laedere and is linked to the right to life in the Anthropocene era. A life 
that would no longer be possible without a safe and stable climate. The affirmation 
of this right should allow each person to complain about the threat of serious or 
irreversible damage pursuant to Art. 3 UNFCCC and to require that the State and 
corporations respect the stability of the climate system92.  
Above all, it must be stressed that this decade is crucial to modify the 
collective approach to climate change and to avoid the most catastrophic and 
irreversible consequences of this phenomenon93. Therefore, a revision of the 
legislations in force is needed both at EU and domestic level in order to adopt 
stricter rules of greenhouse gas emissions under international standards. More 
importantly, a paradigm shift in the Western model of development is needed to 
legitimate new measures in the name of the Earth’s survival, and with it our own 
and that of the generations yet to be born. 
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93 See IPCC, Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C 
approved by governments, 2018, at www.ipcc.ch/sr15/. 
